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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
interest at a later date, even if the plaintiff has withdrawn from the public
eye.
J. J. E.
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAw-LAY PRACTICE BEFORE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION - ENFORCEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT-
[Missouri].-Plaintiff, a duly authorized and licensed layman practitioner
before the Interstate Commerce Commission, sued the defendant corpora-
tion in Missouri for fees for services rendered under a contract of employ-
ment made in Illinois. By the terms of the contract plaintiff was to
represent defendant on a contingent fee basis in certain rate reduction cases
before the Interstate Commerce Commission. Defendant demurred to plain-
tiff's petition, alleging that the contract was contrary to the public policy of
Missouri, since it called for services amounting to the practice of law as
defined by statute in Missouri. The demurrer was sustained and plaintiff
appealed to the supreme court. Held, that the lower court erred in sustain-
ing the demurrer to plaintiff's petition.1 The contract was valid according
to federal law, which was binding on the State of Missouri under the
"supreme law of the land" clause of the Federal Constitution,2 and the
Missouri statute defining and regulating the practice of law does not de-
clare a policy against any right accorded by federal law. De Pass V. Harris
Wool Co. 3
The Missouri statute defines the practice of law as, inter alia, "the
appearance as an advocate in a representative capacity * * * before * * *
any body, board, committee or commission constituted by law or having
authority to settle controversies * * *.,,4 Thus in Missouri only a licensed
lawyer can appear and practice before an administrative agency. The
Supreme Court of Missouri has held, for example, that this statute, as a
valid exercise of the police power, confines the practice of law before the
State Public Service Commission to duly licensed attorneys. 5 Plaintiff,
therefore, could not have entered into a valid contract to appear as an
advocate before any state agency.6
With the rapid growth of administrative agencies in recent years, prac-
tice before state and federal agencies has been much discussed by legal
writers.7 There is no uniformity among the forty-eight states as to the
rights of laymen to appear before the various state agencies.8 There is
1. Defendant thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri en
bane.
2. Art. 6, cl. 2.
3. (Mo. 1940) Div. 1, May Term, No. 36,559 (unpublished).
4. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 11692.
5. Clark v. Austin (1937) 340 Mo. 467, 101 S. W. (2d) 977.
6. See Howard, Control of Unauthorized Practice Before Administrative
Tribunals in Missouri (1937) 2 Mo. L. Rev. 313.
7. See Gambrell, Lay Encroachment on the Legal Profession (1931)
29 Mich. L. Rev. 989; Hicks and Katz, The Practice of Law by Laymen and
Lay Agencies (1931) 41 Yale L. Rev. 69; Howard, supra note 6.
8. In response to questionnaires sent to the attorney generals of the
forty-eight states by Professor Ralph Fuchs of Washington University Law
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similar lack of uniformity concerning the right to appear before the many
federal administrative agencies. The problem is complicated by the fact
that federal agencies do not get their power to regulate proceedings before
them from any one statute.9 For any federal agency the provisions for
admission to practice are dependent upon the Congressional act creating
the agency. The right to appear before some agencies is given to lawyers
and laymen by express statutory provisions2o Some agencies within execu-
tive departments have admitted laymen to appear before them under a
general statutory provision authorizing the executive departments to pre-
scribe their own rules of procedure, not inconsistent with law, for the
government of the departnents."' Similarly, some "independent" agencies
have admitted laymen to appear before them under authority inferred from
their general power, granted by the statutes creating them, to prescribe
their own rules of procedure.1 2
In 1929, pursuant to its power to make its own "general rules or orders"
for the regulation of proceedings before it,13 the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission issued its present Rules of Practice.1 ' Thus the Rules of Practice
can be considered as having the force of a federal statute upon the regula-
tion of commerce between the states. Rule I provides for the admission to
practice before the commission of attorneys and laymen who possess the
"necessary legal and technical qualifications."15 Here it is to be remembered
School, for the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Adminis-
trative Law, thirty-eight states replied to the following question, inter alia:
"Before which important State administrative agencies, if any, may non-
lawyers represent interested parties?" In only nine of the answering states
could laymen not practice before state agencies. (Okla., Idaho, Va., W. Va.,
Tenn., Nev., Ark., Mass., and Neb., did not reply.)
In People ex rel. The Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman (1937) 366 I1. 346,
8 N. E. (2d) 941, the court held that the rule of the Illinois Industrial
Commission, purporting to allow the right to practice law to one not a
duly licensed attorney, was void. In State ex rel. Daniel v. Wells (1939)
191 S. C. 468, 5 S. E. (2d) 181, a layman appearing before the South
Carolina Industrial Commission was held to be engaging in the practice
of law.
9. See Committee on Administrative Practive of the Bar Association of
The District of Columbia, Admission To and Control Over Practice Before
Federal Administrative Agencies (Pamphlet, 1938) 5.
10. See: (1884) 23 Stat. 258, 5 U. S. C. A. (1927) sec. 261 (Treasury
Department); (1884) 23 Stat. 101, 5 U. S. C. A. (1927) sec. 493 (Depart-
ment of Interior).
11. R. S. (2d ed. 1878) sec. 161, 5 U. S. C. A. (1927) sec. 22.
12. (1917) 40 Stat. 270, 49 U. S. C. A. (1929) sec. 17(1) (Interstate
Commerce Commission); (1939) 53 Stat. 160, 26 U. S. C. A. (1940) sec.
1111 (United State Board of Tax Appeals). This was construed by the
Supreme Court, in Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals
(1926) 270 U. S. 117.
13. (1917) 40 Stat. 270, 49 U. S. C. A. (1927) sec. 17(1).
14. Adopted July 1, 1929. See 10A F. C. A. (1938) 755.
15. In Public Service Traffic Bureau, Inc. v. Harworth Marble Co. (1931)
40 Ohio App. 255, 178 N. E. 703, plaintiff sued on a contract of employ-
ment whereby plaintiff was to "prepare, file, prosecute and adjust all
claims arising out of defendant's freight bills." The court held that plain-
tiff could appear before the Interstate Commerce Commission. But it denied
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that plaintiff did not hold himself out to the public as an attorney in
general practice, or in practice before state agencies, but that he entered
into his contract to represent defendant before the Interstate Commerce
Commission only. Granting that the Missouri statute defines the practice
of law before Missouri agencies, the enforcement of a right under this
statute was not the question here. Even if plaintiffs contract had been
made in Missouri, the Missouri statute would not be a paramount declara-
tion as to plaintiff's right to appear before the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, in view of the rule of that body made under its general power to
prescribe its own rules of practice and procedure. Just as a state law
regulating a national bank must give way to a federal statute regulating
the same problem in a different manner,' 6 so here it should be clear that
the policy expressed by the Missouri statute must give way to the Inter-
state Commerce Commission's Rules of Practice.
It should be noted that the decision in the instant case leaves open
the question whether the Missouri courts would enforce a similar contract
to appear before the administrative tribunals of a sister state where such
appearance would be legal. In such a case, of course, the decision could
not be based upon the "supreme law of the land" clause.17
E. A. D.
recovery to plaintiff, interpreting the word "prosecute" as contemplating
the practice of law before the courts, which would have been necessary if
the plaintiff were to take all steps necessary to obtain recoveries. The
court pointed out that an award by the Interstate Commerce Commission
did not constitute a "recovery," since there could be an appeal from such
award.
16. The analogy between the problem raised in the principal case and
the regulation of national banks, which are controlled in part by federal
statute and in part by state law, is suggested by the following cases:
Louisville First Nat'l Bank v. Kentucky (1869) 76 U. S. 353, 362; Waite
v. Dowley (1876) 94 U. S. 527, 532; Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank (1896)
161 U. S. 275, 283; McCellan v. Chipman (1896) 164 U. S. 347, 357.
17. Art. 6, cl. 2.
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